THE New Republic

William S. White:

The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman

PAGE 15-17

We're Still in Trouble

The "climate of opinion" may have changed since Joe McCarthy rode high, but the absurdities and the injustices in our security program remain.

by ADAM YARMOLINSKY

Stevenson and the Farmers . . . . . *Editorial*

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Communists in Morocco . . . . . *Marvine Howe*

"Mind, No Biography" . . . . . *Leon Edel*

NOV 3 1955

NOVEMBER 7, 1955

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Washington Wire .... T.R.B.

Three years ago candidate Eisenhower stumped the farm states pledging the GOP "not merely" to 90-percent parity but to "full parity, 100-percent parity" (Brookings, N. D., Oct. 4). He made this speech half a dozen times. Ike was elected, named Benson Secretary of Agriculture and promptly set about ending 90-percent parity. This has always seemed to us a deliberate—and successful—attempt to fool the farmers by the people who put words in Ike's mouth, though we like to think Ike himself did not know what he was saying, or perhaps even know what "parity" meant.

What we relish today is the praise given by dignified Eastern newspapers to Ike and Benson for their moral courage in rejecting "politics" in agriculture and refusing to listen to appeals for 90-percent parity (which Ike pledged in the campaign). One of the pleasantest ways we can think of for achieving moral grace is to refuse to carry out after the election demagogic promises made during it.

This column has always liked Secretary Benson. He believes earnestly that high rigid farm subsidies are folly, and he is probably right. There are today more than $7 billion worth of surplus foods in storage, and if the Democrats take on the job of adding to this pile, they will do so only at the expense of consumers and city dwellers. It is a pity that Benson's moral position is undermined by the pledges made by his boss.

The awkward palace intrigue by Brownell, Summerfield and Stassen to get rid of Benson behind Ike's back didn't succeed. But Benson has been softened up to the point where he will agree to a series of political fringe benefits for farmers. The first of these—an $85 million pork-buying scheme—looks like a phony to us, with most benefits going to packers and middle-men.

One radical farm solution suggested by Sen. Paul Douglas (from whom spring so many wise proposals) is to emphasize the family-size farm in future federal subsidies. At present the big producer gets most of the money. Why not limit payments in future to the first $5,000 of farm income, say?

On October 24, the reliable Associated Press reported: "Republicans were circulating today a report accusing union labor leaders of using 'violence and coercion' in a 'conspiracy of national proportions' aimed at controlling the 1956 election results." The AP story said Sen. Barry Goldwater (R, Ariz.), chairman of the 1956 Senatorial Campaign Committee, offered the report at the off-the-record "campaign school" put on here officially by national GOP headquarters September 7-10, for GOP chairmen from 48 states. Goldwater's committee was a co-sponsor of the meeting. He told the conference (according to the AP) that organized labor is "conspiring" and getting ready "for massive use of political slush funds—on a nation-wide scale." It was a speech designed to make the Cadillac-driving committeemen's flesh creep.

GOP headquarters here has been besieged by inquiries, but significantly there has been no denial. A frankly anti-labor stand by a big political party would be a new thing in American politics but in many ways a logical one. In past years Administrations have normally included three-way interests: business, labor and farmer, but this one is almost wholly pro-business. Up to now in elections the GOP red-meat issue has been "Communism"; the thought occurs that leaders may now be considering substituting "labor" for "subversives." Isn't there just one more victory in a slam-bang, rabble-rousing attack on trade unions? . . . Seventeen GOP Senators up for re-election next year all get assistance from the Goldwater committee. Unless we hear to the contrary, shall we assume the 17 endorse the Goldwater viewpoint?

New York Times, page 1, column 1, Oct. 29: "Adlai Stevenson definitely will enter several state primaries . . . Minnesota and California. . . . Mr. Stevenson is expected to select five or more. . . . " TRB, a week ago: "Stevenson probably will enter five test primaries including California. . . . "

While we are at it, we are also glad to note that Roger Tubby, Harry Truman's amiable press secretary (whom we have mentioned once or twice), is joining Stevenson's headquarters. He is badly needed. Stevenson is an exhilarating — and exasperating — candidate who would rather perfect a phrase than sleep. We sometimes wonder if he became President whether he would have time for anything but writing speeches. Nobody is going to "ghost" for Adlai, but a competent press secretary could get his speeches out on time.

New England floods have drowned several hundred people and destroyed a third of a billion dollars in property. For 25 years experts have urged an integrated, flood control-power program. Always private utilities have shrieked "New Deal!" and blocked the way. So what if a few lives have now been lost? Free enterprise and Hooverism still reign in New England, and Yankees can boast that besides floods they have the nation's highest power rate.

We have listened to a few House committee hearings at which Public Buildings Commissioner Peter Strobel tried to explain about his simultaneous interest in his own construction firm in New York. We don't see how Strobel can stay in government. As in the Talbott affair, the Democrats seem to be extracting another Eisenhower hound's tooth.

Notes: Ohio Governor Frank Lausche's Presidential boom is nonsense; Sen. Richard Russell (D, Ga.) proposed Taft's old admirer only because Southern conservatives want bargaining power at the convention and need a figurehead to rally behind. . . . California Governor Goodwin Knight has by now talked himself out of any serious consideration for the GOP nomination. . . . Harvard economist Sumner Slichter has recently pointed out that the Administration's vaunted stability in living costs is due to the fact that dropping farm prices have so far neutralized rising industrial prices—an explosive condition at either end. . . . Democrats look for encouraging results next week in test spots, for example Philadelphia and New Jersey.

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BEHIND THE HEADLINES

A Cold Afternoon with Minnesota Farmers

"NOBODY presses a button in Minnesota politics and gets results," said Gerald Heaney, the Democratic State Committeeman, "not even Hubert Humphrey." But Hubert pressed the button on October 30, and the State Central Committee of the Democratic-Farmer Labor Party, meeting in Duluth, called on Adlai Stevenson to become the party's Presidential candidate in 1956. The button was pushed hard by the terms of the resolution which instructed the district conventions of the DFL Party to reconvene *"for the purpose of considering the Stevenson candidacy."* For this, in effect, ruled out of order motions from the rank and file on behalf of other candidates. But while a few old timers muttered about democracy and a few others held that the Coonskin Cap had support, the resolution passed unopposed and with warm support.

Stevenson is far and away the first choice of Minnesota Democrats, and their respect for him was increased by his speech, followed by an hour and a half of handshaking, the night before. The only real question was whether the Committee would bracket Humphrey's name with Stevenson's as Minnesota's Vice Presidential choice. Humphrey certainly is running; but Stevenson's advisers suggested that a joint endorsement would lessen the impact of Minnesota's action across the nation and the Committeemen saw the point.

On that Sunday morning, while the Central Committee got down to business, Governor Freeman, a Lutheran, led Stevenson, a Unitarian, and Humphrey, a Congregationalist, off to Duluth's First Lutheran Church. When the service ended Stevenson set out with Freeman in the Governor's Cadillac on the long bleak road to St. Cloud, pursued by a small band of hungry journalists and worried drivers.

At Foley, a small town in Republican territory, the Cadillac stopped to pick up Charles Stickney, a former Department of Agriculture official who now runs a farm near St. Cloud and serves on the Democratic National Committee's 15-man Agricultural Advisory Committee. Stickney led the motorcade on to a roadside farm where a group of weather-beaten men waited under an elm. The Cadillac drove past them and up to the sliding doors of a poorly-painted cow barn. The farmers strode after them, and the journalists followed, hopping through the muck.

This was the 220-acre dairy farm that Robert and Kerney Henry had taken over when their father died. The two boys, one in a sports coat and yellow shirt, the other in a leather jacket, stood by the barn door. Their trouble, Stickney told Stevenson, was flexible price supports. The boys stood silently as Stickney spoke for them. Stevenson listened with pursed lips. The journalists, trapped in the narrow aisle between two rows of Holsteins, moved restlessly as the cows spattered manure, and at one side of the menfolk a shy group of farm wives stood bundled up in shawls against the first chill of winter.

At last Stickney called on the Henry brothers to bring out their figures of cost and income. Shielding their books from the curious eyes of other farmers, they demonstrated that their gross income had remained constant since 1948, their costs had risen sharply, and their net income for the labor of both men and the return on invested capital had fallen by two-thirds to $2,400 a year. "Flexible supports don't work," cried Stickney. "Lower farm prices cause greater surpluses because as you can see these boys have to work harder and produce more to earn as much." The Henry brothers nodded, but without conviction. It seemed more probable that they had been and were now producing all that two men could with a given farm plant.

"Why not ask the rest of the farmers here," said Robert Henry and Stickney agreed. "Isn't it true that flexible supports produce surpluses?" he demanded. "By God, I'm a liar if it ain't the truth!" cried one burly farmer. But others muttered, *"prices went down under the rigid supports,"* and *"trouble is them labor unions run the price of machinery up with all their wage demands,"* and *"it's better'n sending money overseas and having foreigners shoot at our boys."*

There was a pause. "Well," said Robert Henry to Stevenson, "how'd you like to have your picture with the biggest bull in Benton County?" Stevenson burst out laughing and deferred to Freeman. The reporters and photographers hung back, for the great bull imprisoned behind light bars, had been roaring menacingly throughout the interview. It seemed, however, that all the bull wanted was attention. It thrust its ringed nose forward and seemed pleased by gingerly pats. Next a baby Holstein was tugged out to be photographed. Freeman knelt behind it, gripping it by the neck and hindquarters. Stevenson laid a gloved hand on its head. The flash bulbs lit up the barn's dark interior. Stevenson remarked, "If you work on her much more Orville you'll get her vote!" More laughter. Then the motorcade rolled away toward the airport.

Minneapolis M.S.

ADLAI E. STEVENSON

The special issue of *The New Republic* assessing the qualifications of Adlai E. Stevenson for the Presidency, announced originally for this week, will appear week after next, in the issue dated November 21.

Another New Look

REPUBLICAN PARTY leaders at the highest level have reached a decision on their campaign appeal for 1956—a new look for "Eisenhower conservativism"—and outlined their strategy. The look was unveiled in two trial speeches, very similar in content and delivered the same week, by Presidential Economic Advisor Gabriel Hauge and Vice Presi-

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dent Nixon. Their appeal fits well with the sickroom strategy of Presidential Assistant Sherman Adams and follows a chain of reasoning which would transform into Republican assets all the handicaps of the President's illness.

The Republican reasoning assumes the President will not run. The GOP cannot afford to invite a free-for-all for the President's mantle because this would jeopardize the President's program in the next session of Congress and could impair the role of Vice President Nixon as constitutional successor, ready to step into the Presidency at any time in the next 14 months. Thus any clash of Republican personalities must be postponed for as long as possible, preferably until the convention next August. This means the party must go before the people during 1956 on the basis of issues, not men.

And what of the issues? Foreign policy, it is assumed, will not be a point of damaging Democratic attack. But on domestic policy it is expected that the Democrats will promise the people more than the Administration has proposed. To this the answer is simple. Republican campaigners must seize the initiative and outpromise the Democrats. And every assertion must carry the stamp of the Eisenhower image.

Mr. Hauge spoke before the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco on October 14, Mr. Nixon before the Investment Bankers Association in New York City on October 19.

Mr. Hauge defined "Eisenhower conservativism," as offering something for everyone. For the businessman Eisenhower conservativism will protect free markets, profit incentives, sound money, and stable economic growth. This was Mr. Hauge's pitch to the Republican right-wing.

Next he put on his New Deal-Fair Deal hat. "The Eisenhower conservative is no standpatter," he asserted. "He knows history does not stand still." He believes that "a larger role for government" is needed in solving many problems. Specifically, "the Eisenhower conservative is determined to support and strengthen . . . such government programs as unemployment insurance, social security, housing, collective bargaining, bank deposit insurance, securities regulation, and agricultural price supports."

In short, Eisenhower conservativism offers "the way to a welfare society without the regimentation of a welfare state." It is a philosophy, he concluded, which is "fit for today and many tomorrows."

Mr. Nixon was even more glowing in his claims. Eisenhower conservatives, he declared, "have offered to the country workable programs which we believe will build more roads, schools, houses, provide better medical care, develop more power and water resources than our predecessors ever dreamed of."

"We oppose the programs of our predecessors," he said, "not because they were too high *but because they were too low.*"

At this point Mr. Nixon, like Mr. Hauge, made his bow to the Republican right-wing, and added, "Some may shake their heads and say, 'This sounds too New Dealish, too liberal'. The answer is that true conservativism has always been progressive, and to obtain the support of a majority of the people it must continue to be."

So there you have a campaign line: Promise the people all that the Democrats have offered under Roosevelt and Truman, but "without socialism"; call it conservativism, and preface it with the name Eisenhower.

The bedside strategy of Sherman Adams in controlling the President's visitors contributes to this strategy. If the GOP is to run on the Eisenhower name, it is important that the President impress upon the country that he is in active control of the government. Therefore he must dominate the news. Since Eisenhower cannot yet hold press conferences, or even be burdened with day-to-day problems during convalescence, Adams hit upon the strategy of starting work upon the State of the Union message two months earlier than usual. This brings to the Denver hospital a parade of official visitors, and each, after talking with the President, holds a press conference at the hospital. These conferences follow a pattern. First, the emissary from the bedroom comments favorably on the President's appearance Next, he outlines some new piece of the Eisenhower program, which the President himself requested before his illness, and which he has now approved after a careful review. And before the conference is over, each official gives assurance there was no political discussion. So the pattern emerges: the issues, the Eisenhower image, and no talk of the campaign.

Mr. Hauge himself demonstrated how to combine Mr. Adams' bedside strategy with a campaign of outpromising the Democrats. On October 24, Mr. Hauge announced that President Eisenhower had approved sending to Congress a program to aid the nation's chronically depressed areas.

Last January when the President's economic message to Congress gave little recognition to the areas of continuing unemployment, Eisenhower was criticized by the Democratic majority

THE New Republic A JOURNAL OF OPINION

1826 JEFFERSON PLACE, N. W. WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

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Published weekly and Copyrighted, 1955 in the USA by New Republic, Inc. Phone: REpublic 7-8656. Entered as second-class matter September 26, 1950, at the post office at Washington, D. C., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Single copy, 20c; Yearly subscription, $7.00; Foreign, $8.00; Armed Forces personnel or students, $5.00.

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and Senator Paul Douglas (D, Ill.) introduced legislation in July Providing a detailed program of action. Without a word of this background, Mr. Hauge now offers this program as an example of "Eisenhower conservativism."

This preparation to run on the record of a predecessor is not without precedent. Democrats for 20 years reminded Republicans of Herbert Hoover and Hooverism; while those same Democrats used the portrait of Franklin D. Roosevelt on campaign platforms for years after his death. Now the ideas of FDR seem ready for reworking in another campaign—and this time by both parties.

Faure: The Man Who Succeeds with Failure

A MAN who understands French politics better than most Americans in high office, Deputy Under-Secretary of State Robert Murphy, once commented on the return to the premiership of an old-line hack who had been out of sight and hearing for many years: "In French politics no man is ever dead or even dead beat until he is, literally, physically buried under ground." Yet even in French politics Edgar Faure has unusual survival powers. Three times in a row in recent weeks he was written off as doomed to almost certain failure. Certainly there was nothing in the results of his foreign policy to help him; everything was for the worst in the worst of possible worlds—the adverse vote of the UN on Algeria, the similar vote of the people of the Saar and of those of south Viet-Nam, the rebellion of the generals in Morocco, the solutions which solved nothing and then the fantastic shift of heretofore pro-French El Glaoui to support of ex-Sultan ben Youssef. Yet despite all this—and much that was equally bad at home—Faure scraped together the necessary votes every time in the Assembly and became the most confounding figure in the setting of utter confusion.



The first test was on Morocco. Faure won by getting the Left to vote with him, though not for him, against the cabal of the generals and an implicit threat to the Fourth Republic. The second test was on Algeria. Faure won this time by mobilizing the Right in protest against the anti-colonialists in the UN. Finally, on October 28, Faure did it again.

This time the Assembly dropped policy altogether as a measure of judgment; the members were guided by personal considerations—what can be more personal for a French politician than wanting to keep his job? In essence, the Assembly voted its confidence in Faure's ability to keep Pierre Mendès-France out of the premiership.

Technically, the question before the Assembly was confidence in the government's general policies. In fact, it was on whether the national election date would be advanced from June, 1956, to December, 1955, or March of next year and how the election is to be conducted.

The present Assembly was elected in 1951 when there seemed to be serious dangers to parliamentary institutions from the Communists and from the Gaullist Rally of the French People. To head off such dangers an unusually tricky electoral law was adopted and used. Edouard Herriot called the law inept and monstrous; Remy Roure said it was the least honest in French history. Here is one example of how the law worked: in the Lille district 107,000 Socialist votes elected five members; 106,000 Communists no members; 84,000 MRP votes elected four members; 94,000 Gaullists no members.

Now the Gaullists have split up and the Communists have weakened. The struggle for power between Faure and Mendès-France, both members of the Radical Socialist Party, reflects the fact that the division between potential present-day Right-of-Center and Left-of-Center majorities in the Assembly lies through the middle of their party. Faure has proposed the earlier election—in December—because, he says, all of 1956 should be devoted to new policies instead of half to domestic bickering and half to policies. He has also, reluctantly, agreed to have the question of a new electoral law considered simultaneously with the question of the earlier election. But no one trusts him anymore, least of all the Mendèsists and their direct or indirect allies.

The Socialists would like an early election because they fear that the old election law would, this time, help the Communists, and if the election were delayed until next summer, force them to reconsider their opposition to "popular front." The Mendèsists believe they would do best if they had more time for campaigning, and if the law were changed.

Impartial observers, not committed to either side in the Faure-PMF duel, find it difficult to believe that an election, whether held soon or late, could change the pattern of the Assembly, make it more truly representative and more governable, unless it were held under a law quite different from that of 1951.

PMF needs time, first to win against Faure and the right-wing at the congress of his own party, and then, armed with the control of that party, to win—with a new electoral law—the elections, either allied with the Socialists or with their benevolent neutrality. If he succeeded, he might attract to his side enough of the forward-looking elements of the MRP and of the ex-Gaullists to build a sound, Left-of-Center New Deal coalition. But PMF does not want a majority dependent upon the Communists: to upset Faure and get the new electoral law, yes, he would accept their support; but to get to power and to govern, he probably would not.

Foreign policy isn't the problem. Nor is it, despite the rhetoric, France's place in the world. The root of the problem is domestic reform, not only of institutions but—as ex-President Auriol put it—in "a reform of political habits." Faure turns backward, Mendès-France forward; Faure can feed on failure, provided that he understands the dosage and the distribution; PMF fails when he fails. The question is whether France can succeed if he succeeds.

Those of us who have known France a long time begin to wonder. Stendhal once said that in France great passions are as rare as great men. Whatever one may think of Charles de Gaulle, there is no doubt that he had a great passion, for France. Whatever one may think of PMF, there is no doubt that he is a great technician. France needs both passion and technique in its leaders and its people. It is there that the doubts lie. The French, or many of them, don't care. They no longer feel a need to be protected from the Russians, and they don't think anyone will protect them from the Germans. *"Et alors. . . !"*

Paris PERCY WINNER

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Two-Way Traffic to Moscow

by Haldore Hanson

THE PRESS seemed agreed, when Secretary of State Dulles took off for the current Foreign Ministers Meeting in Geneva, that there was little hope for agreement on German unification and disarmament, but there was a general expectation of progress on Item 3 of the agenda, dealing with increased contacts between East and West. The "measure of success" which Secretary of State Dulles predicted he would obtain on Item 3 was based upon a series of recent Russian gestures:

1. The circumspect visit of a dozen Soviet farm leaders to the United States in July-August has now been followed by the arrival of a group of nine Russian housing specialists and seven Russian journalists. These visits have come off surprisingly well, from the lusty Russian singing of "I'm from I-o-way, THAT's where the tall corn grows" (hands upstretched), to the press conference of Russian journalists at the NY Stock Exchange, where the Russian leader declared they were looking for "the best things" in America.

2. Emil Gilels, one of the most eminent Soviet pianists, scored a sensational success with American critics at his American debut in Philadelphia and subsequent concerts in New York and Washington during October. He is the first Russian artist of note to appear in America since the Prokofief tour of 1938, and is being paid fees equal to the highest ever paid in America. As a return visit, the "Porgy and Bess" company will perform in Moscow in December, and the American violinist Yehudi Menuhin will tour Russia next spring.

3. Three Russian medical specialists attended a conference on antibiotics in New York, and a leading Russian physicist (first to enter the US since the start of the Cold War) is attending a conference in Phoenix, Arizona, on applied solar energy. A large Russian delegation mixed freely with Westerners at the atoms-for-peace conference in Geneva, one commenting innocently to an American that he was "glad my government told us to be friendly to you people."

4. The gates of Moscow and a few other Russian cities have been opened to a flood of foreign visitors, including a score of US Senators and Representatives, most of them on brief conducted tours.

5. American newsreel footage is now showing in the Russian state theatres, and Russia has agreed to exchange medical films with the US.

6. Russian officials announced in August that 2,000 Russian citizens, screened by local trade union committees, would be allowed to spend vacations abroad this year. The first groups have already visited Poland and Finland, and parties are expected in Sweden. This is the first foreign vacationing by Russians since 1939.

7. In the area of press freedom, more temporary visas have been given to American correspondents. There was a brief lifting of censorship during the Adenauer visit to Moscow, and the Russian press has been carrying substantially full texts of important statements by President Eisenhower since last July. The first American correspondent accredited by satellite Rumania since 1947, Jack Raymond of the *New York Times,* reports no censorship of his dispatches.

8. All Soviet research libraries were recently authorized to engage in direct book and periodical exchanges with the West. A representative of Harvard University has already reached agreement in Moscow for exchanges between a group of American universities and major Soviet research institutes. The American publications to be supplied include not only university books but subscriptions to the *New York Times* and a choice of any of the 12,000 books published annually in the US.

9. The Russians have begun to broadcast by radio facsimile the kind of weather charts which meteorological centers in other countries have been transmitting for years. These facsimile maps transmitted daily are of great value to commercial aviation. But they also have a military value. The decision to join other nations in making this information available must have been a calculated one.

THESE are commendable first steps. Conceivably some of these steps pose risks for the security of the present Regime and are undertaken as the price of lowered tension. That suggests a very favorable climate for the negotiations.

But to Secretary Dulles, sitting down at Geneva to look beyond the "Geneva spirit," these gestures fall far short of the American goal of lifting the Iron Curtain so that 200 million Russian people may know the truth about the outside world. The criterion for this longer look was well stated recently by the *London Economist:*

> No people that fully understands the implications of fission-fusion and fall-out, and knows what retribution the next open aggression will invite, would consciously

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let itself be led by the nose into such a disastrous adventure. . . . Today, any regime that wants its subjects to follow it tamely into thermonuclear frenzy needs to keep their minds even more tightly sealed against the knowledge that would breed hesitation.

Viewed in this light, freedom of communication between East and West is a major security measure against war, and ranks with German unification and military disarmament as a single package for negotiation. In this trilogy Item 3 might properly be called political disarmament, and substantial progress on this item may be as difficult to achieve as progress on arms limitation itself. It is in fact possible to foresee vigorous clashes as the foreign ministers discuss a greater flow of ideas, goods, and people.

"ITEM 3"
as defined by the four heads of state in Geneva last July

"Development of contacts between East and West. The foreign ministers should, by means of experts, study measures, including those possible in organs and agencies of the United Nations, which could (a) bring about a progressive elimination of barriers which interfere with free communications and peaceful trade between peoples and (b) bring about such freer contacts and exchanges as are to the mutual advantages of the countries and peoples concerned."

TAKE first the increased flow of ideas by radio. Not long ago Communist Party Leader Nikita Khrushchev told a visiting group of five US Senators in Moscow that it would be desirable for America to discontinue its Voice of America broadcasts to the Soviet bloc. *Pravda* went further in suggesting that the "Geneva spirit" required an end of "the radio war."

"The radio war" has many participants. Official information programs of the US, Britain and France beam news into Russia and the satellites. A much tougher editorial line is taken by the "unofficial" transmitters manned by refugees and financed largely by voluntary American contributions. These include Radio Free Europe, aimed at the satellites, Radio Liberation directed at Russia, and Radio RIAS aimed at East Germany.

To shut out these programs the Russians have erected 1,000 jamming stations, manned by 1,600 men, and costing more than $16 million a year. Yet on their side the Soviets are operating overseas broadcasts in many languages, which approximately equal in broadcasting hours all the foreign programs directed at the Communist bloc. The Communists also have their "unofficial" stations—for example, Radio Free Japan, Radio Free Greece, Radio Free Thailand—for which they disclaim responsibility, though Western monitoring devices show these operations originate in Communist territory.

Mr. Dulles could not conceivably acquiesce in any Soviet proposal to "end the radio war." Radio is the only means by which straight-forward Western news can now reach the people of the Communist world. Moreover, the "unofficial" broadcasts and propaganda balloon activities conducted by refugees in Europe have potent support among minority groups in the United States. Under these circumstances, any Russian request to "end the radio war," or American requests to stop the jamming, will end in a deadlock for the present.

The question of a free flow of news and publications into the Soviet Union is equally fundamental to the lifting of the Iron Curtain. No foreign news service is now circulated to Russian papers. Foreign books and periodicals are barred to all but a few officials. Mail is censored. Only 12 foreign correspondents are now "permanently" accredited to Moscow—9 Americans, 2 British, 1 French—and they are given virtually no access to Russian officials and very limited opportunity to travel. No air express is permitted for outgoing pictures or recordings, and no live broadcasts by Western correspondents. There have been exceptions but not many.

When Mr. Dulles raises questions about all these restrictions, he can offer in trade only the modification of a few minor restrictions on publications and correspondents imposed by the US, restrictions which have prevented neither the telling of the Russian story in America nor the gathering of a Communist-slanted news file from this country. On this issue, as on broadcasting, any real progress depends upon unilateral action by the Soviet Government.

If the foreign ministers turn next to the subject of trade, there is little to negotiate. Ever since the imposition of strategic trade controls in 1949, the Russians have been offering businessmen a great opportunity for profits if only the Western Governments would drop their controls. This is a mirage. For in the 20 years before World War II, the Russians found declining need for outside trade under their policy of autarchy, and their foreign-exchange earnings are now so low as to permit very little trading except on a barter basis.

Mr. Khrushchev told members of Congress in Moscow that Russia desires to obtain from America two particular items of trade—foodstuffs and heavy machine tools. Actually, Russians are free to buy foodstuffs on the US open market now, but have preferred to deal with other countries where prices are lower and credit available. The Russians would probably bargain for government-held farm surpluses on a cut-rate basis, but the problem is commercial, not political.

Heavy machine tools are a very different problem. Foreign Correspondent Marguerite Higgins recently described from Gorky, USSR, a visit to the Molotov Works in which she inspected machine tools imported from Detroit, Pittsburgh and Cincinnati in the 1930's

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to produce cars and trucks. "We would like very much," the manager told her, "to get some new equipment from America." Russian industry is able to produce these heavy tools, the reporter pointed out, but only by cutting back the priority on such Russian military items as the turbojet intercontinental bomber, a plane needed only for attack on the US.

Obviously a relaxation of strategic trade controls at this stage would affect the security of the US and could be considered only as part of a package agreement on European security and disarmament. Another deadlock.

This leaves for Mr. Dulles and Mr. Molotov only the field of exchange of persons. This is an area in which the US has acquired both experience and skill. Last year the US enrolled 34,000 foreign students in its colleges, and received 635 exchange teachers from abroad. We had more than 5,000 foreign medical personnel as internes and residents in our hospitals. We sent between 6,000 and 7,000 American students to foreign universities. We had more than 3,000 American technicians serving abroad under the American and UN aid programs, and an even greater number of foreign technicians undertaking short periods of observation or training in the US. Our information program brought hundreds of foreign journalists and cultural specialists to this country for visits. The government has made detailed studies of the impact of these visits upon the attitudes of the visitor, and is amply forearmed in suggesting such a program for the Russians.

"Not yet, but save it."

So what will Mr. Dulles propose? If the Russians prove receptive to greater reciprocity, Mr. Dulles is prepared to suggest a widening series of visits between the two countries. He will propose American Government financing to help American groups who are going to Russia, but administration will remain with private groups. He will propose the easing of some American restrictions on foreign publications in return for similar Russian action. Whatever the climate of negotiation permits, these are the "measures of progress" he predicted.

To administer the Russian exchange program Mr. William H. Jackson, New York investment banker and former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (1950-51) has been appointed. Mr. Jackson's selection is a measure of the toughness with which the US approaches this program. This betrays no new cynicism in East-West relations, for the Russians have always treated the foreign travel of athletes, artists and professional people as a political weapon.

To provide legislation for the new program Rep. Frank Thompson (D, N.J.) and Sen. James Murray (D, Mont.) have already introduced bills in Congress that would expand the concept of the Emergency Fund for International Activity. This Fund consisted of $5 million appropriated in 1954 and again in 1955 to subsidize the participation of American businessmen in foreign-trade fairs, and the appearance of American culture in foreign lands. These politically-oriented exchanges are kept entirely separate from the normal educational exchange program in the State Department.

If Soviet contacts with the West should grow under this hard-headed approach, much good can come of it. Such increased contacts would tend to compromise the Soviet belief that the Marxist system is the best way of life. And such contacts would weaken the distortions of history and of economic theory which Soviet thought control has laid upon the people. Such doubts, in turn, could lead to a slackening of the Soviet revolution and a lessening of its zeal for proselytes.

No less an authority than the chief American intelligence officer, Allen W. Dulles, recently declared in a public address that increasing contacts between the Russian people and the outside world will make it "no easy task" for the present Kremlin leaders to turn the clock back as Joseph Stalin did whenever the Soviet system showed signs of adjusting to the West. "It could be very difficult for them henceforth," he said, "to close off their people to the realities of the outside world."

This led him to predict that "there remains the possibility that newly created wants and expectations, stimulated by education and perhaps by more exposure to the West, will in time compel great and almost unpredictable changes in the Soviet system itself."

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The "climate of opinion" may have changed since McCarthy rode high but the absurdities and injustices in the security program remain.

We're Still in Trouble

by Adam Yarmolinsky

IT HAS BECOME a political cliché to observe that the climate of opinion in the United States today is less clouded with suspicion than it was a year ago. But climate isn't everything. The institutions of our internal security system have not significantly changed in the last 12 months. Some 10 million wage earners in the United States, one out of five in our non-farm working population, are still subject to one or another of the personnel security programs operated by the federal government. The federal civilian-employee program still applies the test of "clearly consistent with the national security" from the Pentagon to the National Gallery. The military personnel program still weighs the pre-induction activities and associations of drafted men in determining the type of discharge they shall receive, and it still makes these determinations even after the men have passed into the inactive reserve. The United States Coast Guard still decides, under the criteria and procedures of the Port Security Program, whether merchant seamen may pursue their calling in the vessels of our Merchant Marine. The Defense Establishment still controls access by private employers and their employees to defense contracts containing any classified information, down through the lowest classification "Confidential." The Industrial Security Program, under which these contracts are administered, is probably least known of our security programs, although it is an increasingly important fact in the day-to-day operations of American industry. The security system of the Atomic Energy Commission still controls access by private risk takers to the furthest frontiers of American industry.

These institutions exist in substantially the same form as they did a year ago. The vindication of Midshipman Landy, which was so widely publicized in recent weeks, only came about through the direct intervention of the Secretary of the Navy, after Landy's case had been processed through all the administrative machinery of the Naval Reserve, plus a specially created Naval Board of Review. The question has yet to be asked, much less answered, in public debate, why the Naval Reserve authorities were incapable of reaching the result which Navy Secretary Charles S. Thomas came to on the same evidence. Surely common sense is not the exclusive prerogative of a Cabinet officer.

The Landy case was not the first time that the problem of guilt by kinship was dealt with at the Cabinet level. A similar problem had arisen, and had been resolved in favor of the accused, in the Radulovich case, decided by the Secretary of the Air Force in 1953. One would suppose that the principles applied in the Radulovich case might have been codified for the guidance of security personnel in cases like Midshipman Landy's. That these principles were apparently not applied as a matter of course is to my mind a warning that institutional practices do survive changes in the climate of opinion.

I submit that the task facing responsible students of the security system is to try to relate it to the realities of the problem with which it is intended to deal. Any individual and any organization loses effectiveness and even becomes dangerous to the extent that it loses touch with reality. It seems to me that our existing security system, judging from the cases I have examined, has two principal characteristics that tend to create an atmosphere of unreality in its approach to the very real problem of internal security.

THE FIRST of these characteristics is the enormous scope of the system, extending to cover positions bearing no reasonable relationship to the security of the United States. When a security officer or board is required to determine whether or not a man's employment is clearly consistent with the national security, he should be able to see some relationship between the real demands of national security and the employee's performance on his job.

If the first characteristic of the security program is its tremendous scope and coverage, a direct consequence is the second characteristic, the incidence in security proceedings of extraordinarily far-fetched charges. When the employee's failure to do his job properly can affect the national security, or when the employee can use his position, either directly or indirectly, to injure the national security, then the question whether his employment is clearly consistent with the national security is a meaningful one. Otherwise the question is likely to become "Could this employee under any conceivable circumstances become a witting or unwitting tool of the Communist conspiracy?" Behind this question is an im-

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plicit major premise that Communism is an infinitely attractive philosophy, and that anyone who has been exposed to it is never out of danger of a relapse.

These far-fetched charges may be simply absurd, or they may reflect an attitude of narrow authoritarianism. My favorite example of the first kind of charge appears in one of our government civilian employee cases:

> 5. [C] requested your release from the US Coast Guard and stated that you would be employed in the government agency with which he was then connected if you would be released from active duty in the US Coast Guard; information indicates that [C] was author of [title of book] which was advertised in a Louis Adamic publication; Louis Adamic has been listed as an official of the Progressive Party in Philadelphia in 1948 which has been cited as a Communist Front organization by the California Tenney Legislative Committee; [C] listed as references Robert E. Sherwood, Owen Lattimore, and [E] who have been identified as members of Communist Front groups.

In other words, it was considered relevant to a determination whether an employee might endanger the security of the United States that a man who wanted to employ him as a subordinate in the federal service had written a book, which had been advertised in a magazine, which had been published by a man, who had belonged to an organization, which had been "cited" by Jack Tenney.

My favorite example of the kind of charge that evinces a distinctly authoritarian attitude appears in a military personnel security case:

> Derogatory information has been received in this office which reveals the following:
>
> That you:
>
> (a) Exhibited a hypercritical attitude toward society that appeared to reflect home indoctrination.

Both of these are extreme examples, but they represent a tendency in the system, which, if unchecked, can have the most dangerous consequences for our democracy.

Can we not limit the kinds of information that justify involving an employee in a security proceeding? Can we not relate them more precisely and realistically to the possibility that his employment may endanger our national security?

My feeling is that an effort to codify, by rule or precedent, the kinds of charges that can result in a proceeding against an employee would be much more fruitful than an effort to codify the ultimate decisions of the boards themselves. It is the people who are unnecessarily subjected to the operations of the system who represent the real human wastage. An analysis of our cases indicates that the average duration of these proceedings is more than nine months, and the average lawyer's fee is more than $500. These bare figures scarcely convey the sense of frustration that oppresses the reader of a hearing transcript. Learned Hand has said he would fear a lawsuit more than a serious illness. A security case is the grimmest kind of lawsuit, and yet it is hedged about with the fewest safeguards against unnecessary involvement.

But more important than the direct effects of indiscriminate charges on the individuals involved are their indirect consequences, casting into shadow whole areas of activity and associations, and thereby imposing increasing restrictions on freedom of thought and expression in the United States.

In one of our cases, the employee's counsel reported that after his client was cleared, she withdrew from all organizations that she had belonged to, except her church. These organizations included the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the local Parent-Teachers Association.

As people who believe in active citizenship, we should all be concerned that the United States Navy in its Civilian Personnel Instructions provides specifically for indoctrination of Navy employees in the dangers of community activity. The Navy manual states:

> A number of our citizens unwittingly expose themselves to unfavorable or suspicious appraisal which they can and should avoid. This may take the form of an indiscreet remark; an unwise selection of friends or associates; membership in an organization whose true objectives are concealed behind a popular and innocuous title; attendance at and participation in the meetings and functions of such organizations even though not an official member; or any of numerous other clever means designed to attract support under false colors or serving to impress an individual with his own importance.
>
> It is advisable to study and seek wise and mature counsel prior to association with persons or organizations of any political or civic nature, no matter what their apparent motives may be, in order to determine the true motives and purposes of the organization in question. The simple principles of good citizenship require that all enthusiasm for well-sounding functions be tempered with the wisdom of full knowledge of the real forces and aims behind them, so that well-meaning citizens will not be unwittingly led into aiding and promoting forces which are contrary to their own basic beliefs.

The kind of security that the author of this manual must have had in mind is scarcely compatible with the late Justice Jackson's eloquent declaration in the West Virginia Flag Salute Case that:

> If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.

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Communists to the Left French Colonials to the Right

French authority in Morocco is now seriously challenged by an increasingly powerful nationalist movement. The French, in support of their opposition to demands for independence, remind us that Morocco with its American military bases is a strategic link in the NATO defense line; further, that the link would be weakened were the nationalists to take power. For, say the French, the Moroccans cannot be trusted by the West and are, in fact, being swayed, if not controlled, by international Communism. This contention is examined in the following article by a resident of Morocco whose book on the people and politics of that country, *The Prince and I*, has just been published.

by Marvine Howe

"IF THE United States doesn't watch her step, she'll lose her half a million dollar wager on Morocco," North African French tell me. "Morocco is well on the way to becoming another Indo-China. The Nationalists are closely linked with International Communism and are only waiting for the right moment to stage a Moroccan Dien Bien Phu. What will happen to the four American air bases here then? What will happen to NATO without her Southern anchor?"

For the past five years, French officials and the local French press have been making allusions to connections between the Moroccan Nationalist movement and the Communist Party. But few of us living here on the spot take these vague accusations seriously. We understand them to be an attempt on the part of certain powerful colonial groups to discredit Moroccan Nationalists in Western eyes—a scare for export only.

But the export value of this scare has dropped sharply in recent weeks. It is more apparent than ever that the Nationalists of Morocco are no longer an unrepresentative minority, but a powerful force which must inevitably take power. Until recently, for example, French colonialists could count on the support of one of the most powerful (and unsavory) Moroccan leaders, the Pasha of Marrakech, El Glaoui. As long as the French were winning, El Glaoui was a dependable partner. Now that French hands are no longer holding the winning cards, the Glaoui has changed partners. Today he supports Nationalist demands for independence and the return of Mohammed ben Youssef (who had been exiled by the French) to the Moroccan throne.

Visiting journalists who talk with many local officials, read the local press and inform themselves at the Protectorate Department of Information, often come away with the impression that International Communism has completely duped the Moroccan people. The government dossier on Communist activity in Morocco—French studies, translations of Communist tracts, editorials, appeals and open letters—leads one to believe that there is a menacing Communist-Nationalist coalition here and that one day Casablanca may share the same fate as that of Hanoi.

French Government officials in Rabat affirm that the Communist Party in Morocco has grafted itself onto the *Istiqlal* (Nationalist) Party and is becoming increasingly influential over the proletariat. Official studies claim that the Communist Party in Morocco has been able to adapt its methods of action perfectly to the particular circumstances in Morocco.

A pamphlet on "Stalinian Communism and Nationalism in Morocco" (handed out by the Protectorate Department of Information) goes even further to say that Communist strategy in this country has been aimed at preventing the admission of the new American air bases to the Western defense system. The CP strategy for doing this, the pamphlet continues, is to detach Morocco

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from France. And so, the writer explains, the Communist Party of Morocco (PCM) loudly proclaims its loyalty to the Nationalist drive for independence.

The many Communist publications on file do show that the Communist Party in Morocco has gone far in identifying itself with a program which might win Nationalist sympathy. On May 1, 1952, the Party addressed an open letter to "Nationalist parties, individuals and all Moroccan patriots" announcing its immediate program, a program close to the pattern of Nationalist demands: the abolition of the Protectorate Treaty and setting up new relations with France and Spain, and the election of a national Moroccan government.

Mohammed ben Youssef

The Communists were so determined to gain Nationalist support that in a declaration on December 3, 1953, they took up the Nationalists' cry for the return of the exiled Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef, although the Sultan had earlier denounced the Communist Party publicly in no uncertain terms.

If one stops there, Communism in Morocco as presented by the French authorities apparently does constitute a serious threat. But the whole truth does not lie in the official French dossier.

"The authorities are right," Nationalists in the Moroccan capital declare, "when they talk about Communist attempts to join the Nationalist movement. It's perfectly true that the Communist Party has adopted the program of the *Istiqlal* and other Nationalist parties. But what the official dossier leaves out is the fact that the Moroccan people have never been fooled by 'Communist Nationalism'."

"The Communists have been very ardent suitors," a leader of the outlawed *Istiqlal* Party told me recently, "but we just aren't interested. When the *Istiqlal* Party was formed in 1944 and we presented a manifesto asking for the independence of Morocco, the French Communist Party condemned our new Nationalist movement, calling us Fascists."

The Nationalists said that Communist name-calling wouldn't have bothered them at the time except for the fact that there were a number of influential Communists in the French Government who did what they could to combat the young *Istiqlal* Party.

"The Secretary General of our Party, Mr. Blafredj, was actually on the point of being executed on 'pro-Nazi' charges," an *Istiqlal* leader told me. "But thanks to investigations made by the British and Americans, he was cleared and his sentence reduced to two years' exile in Corsica. Those were hard times here.

"From 1945-47, the government in France was heavily penetrated by Communists. Remember, Thorez was Vice President of the Council. Our Nationalist Party didn't have an easy time of it."

Then as now, the Nationalists were not authorized to hold public meetings. The Communists, on the other hand, were permitted to hold all the rallies they wanted to in those days. Local authorities were afraid to lift a finger against a party with so much influence in France.

"We realized how strong our movement had become in 1945 when the Communists made a complete reversal of their policy and began to court us," the *Istiqlal* leader declared.

In 1945, local Moroccan Communists changed their name, calling themselves *le Parti Communiste Marocain* (PCM). "This didn't make any difference to us," Moroccans told me. "For the Moroccan people, Communists were still foreigners, Frenchmen."

It was a Moroccan science teacher who told me about the Communists' next move to get into the good graces of the *Istiqlal* Party. "The leader of the Communist Party in Morocco, a Frenchman from Algeria named Ali Yata, completely forgetting that he had once publicly called the *Istiqlal* 'a band of criminals', proposed in August, 1946, the creation of a National Front, uniting Nationalists, Unionists and Communists in a common fight for independence."

Moscow had seen at that time that the United States might make a move toward North Africa, and so the leaders of International Communism had hoped to consolidate their position by establishing "National Fronts" across North Africa. I had read about the Communist proposal for a National Front in the official record. The French had let it be understood that the "front" was an accomplished fact, simply because it had been proposed. There had been no mention in the file of a Nationalist refusal to play the game.

"It was a pretty frame-up," the Moroccan teacher continued. "It would have been so easy to suppress the *Istiqlal* Party and other Nationalist Parties if we had agreed to join this Front. None of our enemies, not even Moscow, had counted on our refusal. But they had all overlooked the fact that the real principles of Communism are diametrically opposed to the basic principles of the Nationalist movement; that is, the independence of Morocco, defense of the Moslem religion, and the founding of a constitutional monarchy."

Nationalist leaders admit that the large majority of the people have very hazy ideas about the significance of International Communism. They also admit that there was one point in their history when there was a very live danger of the laboring classes falling into the hands of the Communists.

"Study the story of trade unionism in Morocco," I

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was told, "and you will see that through the government's policy of active 'neutrality' toward Communist activity here, the working classes were well on the road to becoming Communist without knowing what they were doing."

IT WAS widely known that the government had shut its eyes to its own laws forbidding Moroccans to join unions and for a number of years had tolerated Moroccans belonging to the Communist-affiliated CGT (World Federation of Trade Unions). What had never been publicized was the way in which the Moroccan Nationalist parties, and particularly the *Istiqlal,* combatted the Communists in their own union, and, in the end, succeeded in stealing the union right from under the nose of International Communism.

A concise, factual account of the Moroccans' attempts to organize themselves can be found in the brochure *"Le Syndicalisme marocain en marche"* (banned in Morocco), written by one of the country's foremost union leaders today, Mahjoub ben Seddik. Seddik was arrested in December, 1952, along with many other union and Nationalist leaders and held for almost two years without charges.

In this brochure, the Moroccan union leader explains the equivocal situation of Moroccan laborers, who, not allowed to form their own free unions, were forced into the General Union of Confederated Syndicates in Morocco (UGSCM), a branch of the Communist-controlled French CGT, and thereby leaving themselves open to accusations of Communist sympathies. Seddik proves with concrete examples that the Protectorate Administration tolerated and indirectly encouraged the importation of Communist ideology into Morocco by recognizing the PCM and by co-operating with the UGSCM.

Seddik begins his history of unionism in Morocco by retracing the birth of a proletarian conscience in this country rising out of the mass migration of country folk to the cities just before World War II. The writer points out that city life did not turn out to be a promised land, what with legal exploitation and racial discrimination practiced against Moroccan workers. Moroccans were hired, as a rule, to fill positions which couldn't be occupied by Europeans, as teachers in Arab primary schools, janitors, day-laborers, and servants. They did not receive the family allowances the French received, and wages were decidedly lower for Moroccans than for Europeans. Only workers in modern industry benefitted from any social legislation at all.

The first union formed in Morocco in 1943, the CGT, actively supported by the strongly Communist governments in France, made a great effort to attract Moroccan workers. Seddik explains that it was the misery of the laborers' condition and the lack of any legal means of defense or bettering their position that led them to accept the offers of the CGT. Seddik adds that the masses acted against the advice of the then young Nationalist parties, who realized that the CGT union action was not an end in itself but just a means for creating a strong Communist Party in Morocco.

In spite of repeated *Istiqlal* warnings and boycotts against the CGT, Moroccan workers flocked to this union headed by well-known French Communists. By 1948, there were about 100,000 members in the UGSCM-CGT. Nationalists and workers who opposed this Communist-dominated organization tell me they were considered as reactionaries by the people because the CGT had been able to obtain concrete results for its Moroccan members. Between 1945 and 1948, salaries were increased more than 50 percent, and extra family pay was initiated. The union, with its prominent Communist sympathizers in the government, did much to protect Moroccan workers from racial injustices. All results gained by union action naturally went to the credit of the Communist Party and were widely exploited as propaganda. It was at this epoch, to quote Seddik again, in 1947-48, that the danger of Communism in Morocco was a reality—when the Communist Party's forces spread to every corner of the country.

In the light of present day events, it is difficult to understand why France, even after the Communists lost power in the goverment, continued to wink at this network of Communism which was being organized to undermine her authority in the Protectorate. Moroccan unionists explain that the Protectorate tolerated this Communist-run organization in her desire to use Communism as a brake against nationalism—divide and rule.

"There was only one thing to do under these conditions," a Moroccan union leader told me. "The Moroccan Nationalists had to take over the CGT. It was a kind of elimination contest, a test of force." Nationalist leaders were well aware of the popularity and effectiveness of the CGT, and so rather than combat it openly, they decided to take advantage of the authorities' tolerance of this union. "Our goal was threefold," the union man said, "First, to divert Moroccan laborers away from Communism. Next, to continue to benefit from the union's social action. Finally, to train Moroccan unionists and prepare them for creating their own free organization."

IT DIDN'T take long for the Nationalists to seize moral control of the CGT. "We Moroccans speak the same language and have the same ideology," an *Istiqlal* union man told me. "The Communists have never really been accepted by the Moroccan people." *Istiqlal* Party members, openly hostile to Communism, entered the CGT in 1948. By early 1949, all of the lower organizations were directed by active non-Communist Moroccan leaders.

Once they had gained power in the CGT, the Nationalists' aim was to prove publicly that Moroccans were in

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the Communist affiliated union, not out of political convictions but simply to defend their means of livelihood. A delegation of Moroccan unionists went to the Palace on April 30, 1949, to speak to the Sultan about their equivocal position. "His Majesty assured us of his sympathy and efforts toward passing a law which would give us union rights," a member of this delegation said. "He also urged us to continue to fight against the harmful ideas of Communism."

News of the Moroccans' mutiny against the Communist union did not appear in the carefully controlled local press. Nor was the Sultan's anti-Communist stand publicized, and His Majesty's enemies continued to accuse him of Communist leanings whenever they thought they could gain by it.

THE anti-Communist unionists achieved a public victory in 1950 when the UGSCM, still theoretically and officially affiliated with the CGT, became an autonomous organization, against the will of many of the French delegates who were now in the minority. The new executive board was composed of Five Communists and four *Istiqlal* men.

"We had to keep that many French leaders in the ruling committee," a Moroccan union leader explained, "because otherwise, the government wouldn't have tolerated us any longer."

The rest of the story comes under international trade-union history. In November, 1950, the Moroccan leaders of the UGSCM, sure of their own strength, made contacts with representatives of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Then at a congress in Tunis in April, 1951, Mahjoub ben Seddik, Secretary of the UGSCM and representing Moroccan unions, proclaimed the autonomy of Moroccan trade unions and the provisory nature of their connections with the CGT.

At that time, when Moroccan unionists declared themselves openly hostile to the CGT, they lost the favor of certain influential elements in the Protectorate. They have since been subject to mass dismissal, imprisonment and deportation. This has occurred in the sugar, metal, textile, and canning industries in the main cities of Morocco.

But the Moroccan union leaders were determined to break away completely from Communist ties to organize a free Moroccan union. A congress was called for early February, 1953. At this time the UGSCM was to be transformed into a free trade-union confederation. But it was too late.

In December, 1952, there had been a country-wide strike in solidarity with other North Africans to protest against the assassination of Tunisian union leader Ferat Hached. There had been violence and repression. The French press labeled the strike movement an "*Istiqlal*-Syndical-Communist" plot. The *Istiqlal* Party was outlawed, and many of its leaders and Moroccan unionists were thrown into jail. The Communist Party was banned at the same time to convince the public of the "ties" between the Nationalists and the Communists. No Communists were imprisoned, however, and the CGT was permitted to carry on its activities.

For almost two years after that, Moroccan workers waited while their Sultan and legitimate leaders were exiled or imprisoned, and the authorities kept talking about "union reform" without doing anything about it.

Finally, the Mendès-France government brought a new, if only temporary, look to French Protectorate policy, *Istiqlal* and union leaders were released from prison. This meant that the question of union rights would once again come to a head in Morocco.

This time American union leaders showed an active interest in helping the Moroccan workers break away from their forced bondage to the Communist CGT. On October 20, 1954, the Free Trade Union Committee of the American Federation of Labor addressed a letter to French Ambassador Henri Bonnet, inviting Taib ben Bouazza, General Secretary of the Moroccan Confederation of Labor, to spend several months in the United States as guest of the AFL so that he might see how a democratic, anti-Communist free trade union works.

However, France refused to grant ben Bouazza the needed passport, suggesting that it would be inappropriate for the United States to invite a man "who has had recent connections with a Communist organization."

The AFL leader points out that the State Department is willing to grant the necessary visa to Mr. ben Bouazza as "a bona-fide free trade unionist."

WHEN he was refused his passport to go to the US, ben Bouazza decided to go to Paris. There along with Mahjoub ben Seddik and other Moroccans, he is actively fighting for Moroccan Union rights. The two men head the new Moroccan Workers' Union (UMT), affiliated with the ICFTU, organized on March 20, 1955, in defiance of the French law. This Moroccan union hangs on the hope that France, not wishing to incur the hostility of the ICFTU, will not stamp out this latest Moroccan attempt to organize trade unions free from Communist influence. French Communists in Casablanca have acknowledged to me that their cause underwent an important defeat when Moroccan union leaders split off from the CGT. "There is considerable confusion in the ranks of the Party in Morocco today," Communists admit. "The government's policy is not clear. One day the illegal Moroccan Workers Union members are arrested; the next day they are permitted to publish communiques in the press in a membership campaign. We hope that the administration will see fit to ban this illegal union as in the past. Then we will be able to persuade Moroccans to come back to the CGT."

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BOOKS & COMMENT

A Plain Politician from Missouri

by William S. White

THE Truman Administration, that strange amalgam of simple greatness and great oversimplifications, of an alternating odd humility and ready belligerence, is now twice being revisited.

There is the sudden emergence of the stocky, indestructible figure of the former President as prospectively a very active if still enigmatic power in the oncoming Democratic National Convention amidst suspicion that he may turn out to be neutral for Averell Harriman.

Year of Decisions, by Harry S. Truman (Doubleday; $5).

And there is—and this is more important to the present purpose—the publication by Doubleday of the first fat volume of the Truman memoirs, *Year of Decisions*. Few "statesman books" can possibly have more fascination for all those interested in politics or in humanity—the one, politics, being of course merely the art of dealing with the other, humanity.

To read this book is, among other things, to be nostalgically conscious of the unbelievably accelerated flight of our recent years. And to put it aside the Churchill memoirs is a memorable experience, a realization of the virility and richness of an Anglo-Saxon political heritage capable of producing in one lifetime leaders so profoundly different in some things and with such profound unconscious identity in the things that really matter. There is, surmounting all else, a truly common language between the two: Both are great political "pros."

But against the polished, privileged eloquence of Churchill's prose, Mr. Truman's style is exactly like Mr. Truman himself, clear and umistakable as the sound of a slamming door, dogged, graceless, downright, and wholly without sham as it is without mannered beauty.

So far as can be seen by one fairly familiar with the events of the first year of the Truman Administration, author Truman has not withheld outright any thing of importance. Still being unimpeachably human, he has given the light treatment, indeed, to certain of the substantial facts connected with his career.

With his relationship to the old Pendergast machine in Kansas City, for example, he deals with what can only be called extreme economy; one looks in vain for that defense of the whole rationale of old-fashioned "organization" politics that Mr. Truman might with unexampled authority have made.

Again, the former President has little to say of what many thought to have been one of the most uncharacteristic mistakes of his first year, the proposal to draft the railway strikers into military service. This, he himself says, was "against the principles I believed in and I proposed them [his plans for punitive legislation] only as a desperate resort in an extreme emergency where leaders defiantly called the workers out in a strike against the Government."

MANFULLY, but again briefly, as he had done years ago in an interview with Arthur Krock, Mr. Truman concedes self-blame for having signed without reading a paper that for a time cut off lend-lease at the end of the war and caused great Allied perturbation.

His assignment of ultimate responsibility for allowing what he himself terms a postwar "disintegration" and not a mere demobilization of the then magnificent United States military forces is neither so clear nor so satisfactory. He speaks of the insistent parental pressures to "bring the boys home" and seems to suggest that if only Congress had acted affirmatively on his plan for a universal military training all would have been well. All these incidents, however, are the exceptions to what is on the whole a sturdy rendering of accounts unmarred by that hindsight which, as Mr. Truman acidly observes, can make any schoolboy look sager than a statesman. What comes forth is the great streak of loyalty to others and candor that at length helped to bring so much trouble upon the President.

He deals with the memory of his predecessor, Franklin Roosevelt, with the most faithful gentleness. It seems clear, in fact, that Mr. Truman might well have taken steps capable of altering the world history had he not felt so compulsively and morally bound to a literal pursuit of the policies of his late chief.

The most moving passages are those describing Mr. Truman's first hours and days and weeks in the Presidency. They show a man capable, even while the implacable demands of history were savagely wrenching him about, of being concerned about the invasions to privacy now necessarily being suffered by his neighbors in the Connecticut Avenue apartment house where he had lived. Here he was, a plain politician from Missouri, unashamed of his profession and previous station but terribly aware, all the same and all of a sudden, that Providence had hurled him without notice into the most difficult position ever occupied by a President in history.

The war was drawing to a close in Europe, but Japan still stood in menace in the Pacific, and the end in Europe was in some senses more difficult than the beginning. The Great Alliance already was being strained. Mr. Churchill was gracefully but forcefully insisting, with a judgment of bleak historical accuracy, upon the most urgent exertions among the Western Allies to occupy all they possibly could in Western Europe against the plainly evolving design of the Russians to expand imperially. Stalin, moreover, was becoming more and more cynically intractable about Poland; even in 1945 the Truman White House had clear forebodings that the Soviet had no intentions of living up to the Yalta obligations.

MR. TRUMAN for his part found it necessary abruptly to confront as equals powerful men who had achieved with Mr. Roosevelt an intimacy that tended to exclude his newcoming successor, or at best left that successor open to the unanswerable suggestion that regardless of his wishes *Mr. Roosevelt* had already agreed to such and such. And the President of the United States, who was so soon to make perhaps the greatest decision of the twentieth century in dropping the atomic bomb, did not know until Mr. Henry Stimson

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rather gently told him, that there *was* such a thing as The Bomb.

All during this time Mr. Truman was writing to "Mama and Mary," his sister, out in Missouri. He knew, of course, that he was President and he was quite determined to be nothing less. Still, for a time he walked, as completely as did the smallest laborer who had been a "Roosevelt man," in the long shadow of the dead President. Several days after he had become President of the United States Harry Truman wrote to Mama and Mary: "You have both done fine *under this terrible blow.*"

It is entirely possible that no other man had so precipitately been put under such awesome pressures. Mr. Truman was determined to carry out high policies he never made (though he had agreed with them so far as he knew of them) and thus to go the farthest possible honorable distance in accommodating the Russians in his passion for a postwar organization that would let war come no more.

NEVERTHELESS, this man from his ward days in Kansas City had learned with far greater perception than the sheltered Mr. Roosevelt to smell a breaker of bargains and to sense the onset of bullyism—that man could not from the start down his misgivings.

Thus, for example, he had Molotov call upon him in Washington while the West was working frantically to launch the United Nations under good omens. Stalin was playing a game of sinister dog-in-the-manger over Poland and his commitments there. Mr. Truman accordingly put some homely views before Molotov who at length complained: "I've never been talked to like that in my life!" "Carry out your agreements," snapped the new President Truman, "and you won't get talked to like that."

Over and over, all the way to Potsdam and after, Mr. Truman tried, as his book abundantly establishes, to be tolerant, to be forgiving, to hope for the best from the Russians. At last, however, he had had more than enough, and one of the most ironic disclosures of *Year of Decisions* concerns this fact.

Mr. Truman, before showing the door to James F. Byrnes as his Secretary of State for coming to "think that his judgment was better than the President's," had told Byrnes: "I'm tired of babying the Russians!" This, it should be recalled, was some two years before the formal beginning of "the cold war." The Truman account, indeed, declares in substance that it was Byrnes, a beau ideal now among those right-wingers who were to accuse the President of being "soft toward Communism," who was unduly tender of Russian feelings and aspirations.

Nowhere in the book does the former President *say* he disliked anybody very much. If, however, there is an instance of indicated clear dislike it is for Byrnes, who is represented as having been rather devious in vainly seeking the Vice Presidential nomination in 1944 and as having been openly arrogant toward his chief. Toward Henry A. Wallace, the Truman view appears to have been one of a tolerant contempt. "I have never doubted Henry Wallace's sincerity or honesty of purpose," Mr. Truman remarks, "but . . . I was afraid that knowingly or not he would lend himself to the more sinister ends of the Reds and those who served them." If in this period President Truman was aware that in dismissing Byrnes and Wallace he was promoting the two-headed Right-wing, Left-wing rebellion that rose up against him in 1948 there is nothing to suggest as much.

In truth, one of the curious effects of the book is to suggest re-examination of the quotient and kind of partisanship that lay in Harry Truman. In the ordinary and small affairs of public life, in all that by traditional definition is permissibly partisan, he was partisan indeed. For illustration, in discussing his antagonism as Senator to the confirmation of the appointment of Maurice Milligan to be United States District Attorney at Kansas City, Mr. Truman dissembles little. Milligan, the author recalls, "had been the chief prosecutor in the investigation which had sent many Pendergast workers to jail.":

> I had opposed his confirmation because I thought that more qualified lawyers were available for the job—but with the Jackson County organization in disrepute Milligan was riding a wave of popularity and saying that he would take my job away from me in November.

This is a perfect and entirely unabashed example of purely partisan political reasoning from a man proud to be simply a politician who seems never to have thought of himself or pretended to think of himself as "a statesman."

The salt of the nonconformist and of a lifelong hostility to self-righteousness pervades the book. The former President reflects vigorously that when he was a boy working in a drugstore in Independence and saw eminent citizens going to the back room of a Sunday morning for a nip of whiskey he "learned to think more highly of them [the saloon drinkers] than I did of the prescription-counter drinkers." The suggestion is that his contempt of circumlocution fairly often made it difficult for him to keep his temper in the White House and that, correctly or not, he attributed to Byrnes such a concealment of purpose.

Mr. Truman asserts that when Byrnes went to the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in 1945 he stirred vain fears, wholly without Presidential authorization, that the United States might consent to sharing atomic information; kept the President himself in the dark; issued a communique without consulting the White House, and even wanted personally to address the American people "so that he might report on the results of the conference." "What those results were," Mr. Truman adds "I did not yet know."

As to another man cast out of the Administration, Interior Secretary Harold Ickes, the former President speaks in quite different voice:

> I realized that he [Ickes] was a trouble-maker and difficult to get along with. In a sense I was fond of him, especially because he was not a special-interest man. Although he was a scold and a gossip and everything that implies, I never had a personal clash with him, but when he got too big for his breeches . . . I could not, as President, tolerate that.

WHAT at length appears from it all, even though this is only the beginning of Mr. Truman's story, is also an opportunity for an attempt to reconsider and re-evaluate his first Administration (and even his second) on the basis of data supplied by the man himself.

Perhaps the foremost conclusion of this one observer is an affirmation and a strengthening of what he had earlier reckoned as the great paradox in the case of Harry Truman. This was that, especially after he began to move from the area of the commitments of the dead Roosevelt and thus to make his own foreign policy, this colloquial, homespun and theoretically regional politician was incomparably at his best in great world

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affairs and at his worst in domestic affairs of any description. He supplies such compelling evidence as to leave little remaining doubt, save in the hardest of the anti-Truman hearts, that on the capital questions of war and peace and the preservation of the free Western society he sought with all his strength to avoid the small and the petty, whether small partisanship or small concepts.

This present book of the general accounting has not reached the point where Mr. Truman proclaimed the famous Doctrine for the salvation of Greece and Turkey from Communism, as still later he was to lead for the Marshall Plan and then for the Western Alliance comprising the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The flashback, nevertheless, already is extensive enough to illuminate the fact that Mr. Truman for the most part dealt with the great matters of the world with a sure hand and with a hard sense of realism nicely blended with a kind of practical idealism.

One of the most distinguished of living public men once told me, on my request for a confidential estimate as nearly objective as he could make it, that in 40 years in Washington he had never known a man so truly nonpartisan in foreign affairs as Mr. Truman—or more ruggedly partisan in lesser affairs. This statement was made by a personage who had close relationships with Presidents Wilson, Roosevelt and Truman. But the same book that supports this estimate of Mr. Truman in world affairs reflects his curious weakness in the arena in which he should have been strongest, that of domestic matters.

The former President recalls, for example, with great pride the 21 point "Fair Deal" message that in his first year in the White House he sent to Congress and country both of which in the twilight of the war plainly were turning to the Right, consciously or as unconsciously. Regardless of the merit or lack of merit of that program, its mere submission, at that time and in those circumstances, had about it even then an air of fundamental and inescapable unreality. It might much more readily have proceeded from the mind of a Roosevelt or a Wilson than from the mind of this tough, able, supremely practical politician who in this field of affairs seemed wholly out of touch with that level of public feeling for which above all he presumably should have had the tactile sense of the master.

Thus it is that there is a great historical incongruity not necessarily in the *fact* that the Truman Administration came, toward its end, to such harsh grief, but in the *way* and for the *reasons* that it did. For it was actually in attacking the whole complex of what was objectively the strongest part of the Administration, its conduct of foreign policy, that Mr. Truman's political enemies made their greatest headway. His heirs and assigns, specifically Adlai Stevenson and his campaign associates, were utterly unable, to the extent that they attempted the job, to defend from the accusation of "softness" toward Communism an Administration that actually was most vulnerable of all *because* it spent so much blood in fighting Communism in Korea.

Largely overlooked by the opposition, except in what many politicians in both parties still believe was the collateral and in no way decisive issue of alleged corruption, was this great fact: That at no time whatever, not even in the first afterlight of his amazing victory in 1948, was Mr. Truman able to make of his domestic program a thing strong enough to win for him a truly effective and reasonably durable leadership even of a clear majority of his own party.

"Mind, No Biography . . ."

by Leon Edel

WHEN William Makepeace Thackeray died at 52 almost a century ago he left behind the injunction, "Mind, no biography." This is easy to understand. His wife had been locked away, hopelessly insane; he had formed friendships with other women, notably Mrs. Brookfield; and in his satirical exploration of the "vanity fair" of early Victorian England he had stepped on sensitive toes. Victorian reticence and tact, as distinct from Victorian prudery, dictated his wish—if not the feeling of many artists that one should read their works rather than their lives. But literary lives and reputations have a way of resisting the wishes of their subjects; and where truth—however painful—is not told, legend more often than not takes over.

Thackeray: The Uses of Adversity (1811-1846) by Gordon N. Ray (McGraw-Hill; $7).

In the case of Thackeray, the novelist's six-foot figure had walked through too many drawing-rooms and been the center of too much controversy to be able to elude the extravagance of gossip or the embroidery of rumor and anecdote. Letters began to get into print; unauthorized biographies were written, and over the decades a picture of Thackeray emerged compounded of shreds and patches.

It was not until Gordon N. Ray, then but recently out of Harvard, published between 1945 and 1947 his monumental four-volume edition of the *Letters and Private Papers* of the novelist (with the blessings of the Thackeray descendants) that we began to see the author of *Vanity Fair* in fuller perspective. What emerged in the letters more clearly than ever before was the evolution of Thackeray from a kind of gentleman-about-town to the accomplished deeply-feeling ironist, the writer who was never able to bring the impulse of his simple heart into proper beat with a society that was heartless. As a steppingstone between the editing of the letters and the biography, Mr. Ray published his Lowell lectures, *The Buried Life*, an engrossing study of some of the individuals in Thackeray's world who became characters in his fiction.

Professor Ray has now reached the all-but-final stage in this process of literary restoration. The first volume of this first authorized biography of Thackeray takes the novelist from his birth in India in 1811 to the writing and publication of *Vanity Fair* in 1846—the first 35 years of his career. The second volume will deal with the remaining 17 years. Coming so soon after Edgar Johnson's substantial life of Dickens, this book reminds us of the slowness of the entire biographical process, of how many decades must elapse before we can possess all of a creative personality, the mind that nourished the work. Even if we allow for Forster's Dickens and

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Lewis Melville's Thackeray, it is only now, in the middle of our century, that we are being given palpable figures of the two novelists who, more than any other writers of their time dominated the first half of the Victorian era (in the field of fiction) and threw their formidable shadows across the rest of it into our own time.

We are nevertheless led to the reflection that if in England during the past 50 years there has been a tendency to see the eminent Victorians in a somewhat fading and patronizing after-glow (as we tended for a time to see some of our writers of the New England flowering), it is in America that a more objective picture can emerge. What is remarkable in Mr. Ray's study is not only his deep saturation in the life of his subject but the way in which he bestrides Victorian London and introduces us to many of its figures as if he had personally known them. We meet not only the *dramatis personae* of Thackeray's childhood in India and England, but encounter the shadowy men of Grub Street, and the little band of writers who made *Punch* the institution it became, and remains, in England. Mr. Ray observes that "Victorian society at its best surely had a dignity and maturity unmatched in our own time."

There is perhaps less overt drama in the life of Thackeray than in the life of Dickens; Dickens rose rapidly out of his poverty to heights of wealth and public adulation. Thackeray's life during the first thirty-five years at least has an almost plodding character. Born in India, an only son who lost his father at five, he was formed during boyhood and adolescence in the schools of England. His doting mother re-married and Thackeray was deeply attached to the reconstructed household. Mr. Ray tells us how the young man came to see life as a sharp contrast between the warmth and trust of a happy home circle and the selfish indifference of the outside world. (One is tempted to suggest that Becky Sharp symbolized the latter, Amelia the former.) It took three generations to fashion a gentleman, Thackeray observed, and Mr. Ray shows us the generations that fashioned the young man who decorated London drawing-rooms, dabbled in art, and gambled away much of his inheritance while still a student in Cambridge. Thereafter, by degrees, "the horrible glazed eyes of Necessity" turned him to ungentlemanly tasks to support a melancholic wife and two young daughters. Where other gentlemen are overwhelmed by such responsibilities, Thackeray's vision of life grew even sharper. The gentleman became a hack writer; the writer acquired a finished style; ultimately he became an accomplished novelist. To such uses did he put adversity.

From Mr. Ray's documentation one gains the picture of a man of transcendant literary gifts, with a penchant for high bohemia, amiable, sentimental, romantic, who was forced too abruptly to say farewell to a rather boisterous youth and the cheerful ways of a seemingly benign world—and yet had the courage to face that reality. Indeed his strength lay in his gradually grasping and reflecting the society which he had found so smiling, and which he knew to be both powerful and petty, hard and evil. As a truthful man he sought to express this reality and it shines with a clear hard light in the pages of *Vanity Fair*. But truth and reality are often cruel and endured with difficulty by the mind. Some anodyne is needed; and so in Thackeray's writings truth now and again is bathed in gentle illusion, or clothed in the graceful garments of the novelist's wit and geniality. As he grew older a strong nostalgia for his earlier years suffused his writing and softened the sharp edges of his pictures.

It is this which leads me to wonder whether Mr. Ray in his otherwise judicial appraisal of the novelist's formation, is not splitting hairs when he observes that Thackeray represented in his mature art "the classic moment of English realism."

Where exactly are we to place such a moment in a century that was to give us such works of realism as *Middlemarch* or *The Portrait of a Lady*? Indeed it can be argued that in deciding to walk upon the stage and mingle with his own puppets, Thackeray forsook realism, and looked to the past and not to the future of the novel.

In making this modest claim for Thackeray as realist, Mr. Ray also points out that as a moralist the writer has been placed on a plane with Carlyle and Dickens. He earned this place, the biographer believes, by re-defining the gentlemanly ideal, "to fit a middle-class rather than an aristocratic context." But the realist has been criticized for watering his reality; and the moralist has been judged deficient—as Bernard Shaw did—in his egalitarianism. The present volume places the dual character of Thackeray before us. In the process of revaluing him it is well to remind ourselves that we should withhold final judgment; that his was a constantly-maturing personality; and that a second volume is to bring us further light.

The Freedom to Teach

by Henry M. Magid

RECENT investigations by local, state and federal agencies with assorted intentions and varying degrees of qualification into the colleges and universities of this country have brought to the attention of the public a relatively unknown concept, academic freedom. Since the cry of violation of academic freedom has been raised, among others, by some accused of subversive activities, the public mind of this freedom-loving country has become rather confused. What is academic freedom? Is it a claim by one interest group for special privilege? Is it a mask behind which clever men hope to hide their subversive activity? Or is it a precious value which all citizens of a democratic society ought to rally to defend? It is undoubtedly all of these to some extent, which makes it all the more crucial that we discover its historical roots, its philosophical basis, and its contemporary bearing.

Academic Freedom in Our Time, by Robert A. MacIver (Columbia; $4). *The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States*, by Richard Hofstadter and Walter P. Metzger (Columbia; $5.50).

Two volumes published under the auspices of the American Academic Freedom Project at Columbia University assemble much useful information which may serve as background for a brief analysis of this subject. *The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States* by Richard Hofstadter and

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Walter P. Metzger and *Academic Freedom in Our Time* by Robert M. MacIver offer over 700 pages of carefully documented and clearly presented history and analysis. The first traces the changing conceptions of academic freedom and justifications for it from the middle ages to the present. Professor MacIver's work is perhaps the most complete and balanced survey of the situation and problems of academic freedom in this country that has appeared to date.

The demand for academic freedom is the demand for freedom of inquiry as that demand is voiced in a peculiarly modern context. The study of the development of the idea and reality of academic freedom shows quite clearly that while there has always been a demand by philosophers and other pursuers of the truth for freedom to inquire, even to challenge prevailing beliefs and attitudes, the demand for academic freedom emerges when inquirers are forced by the conditions in society to earn their livelihood as teachers of the young.

Yet this is not the result of merely accidental circumstances. To an isolated individual seeking the truth, the demand for freedom to follow his interest is the demand to be left alone. Societies have been willing to leave men alone if they were willing to leave the society alone.

And yet most thinkers are reluctant to keep their results to themselves. At worst the desire for reputation, at best the desire to serve mankind, and at least the desire to find disciples who will perpetuate the scholarly enterprise lead inquirers to communicate their views to others. Thus academic freedom includes freedom to convey to others, especially the young, the results of one's inquiries even if those results are at variance with the prevailing view, that is the view of the government in non-democratic societies and of public opinion in democratic societies. If the society in which the investigator finds himself happens to have no decided view of its own on the subject matter under investigation or if there are many views and none dominates, the urge to teach may arouse no opposition and cause no conflict.

But if no such good fortune favors the inquirer, he has two main courses open to him. If he retires to his study and abandons the attempt to publicize his ideas, they will die with him or perhaps appear posthumously. This course will require either public silence or some form of dissembling. Or he may rebel and proclaim his right to inquire as he pleases and to teach what he thinks he has discovered.

To modern liberals all courses other than that which proclaims the right to academic freedom are dishonest, morally reprehensible and in the long run detrimental to the best interests of mankind. They take their stand on the most obvious interpretation of the maxim "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." But is this position as philosophically and sociologically sound as it is emotionally appealing? There is no doubt that *if* free inquiry is the avenue to truth, and *if* it is possible to communicate the truth, and *if* the communication of the truth to mankind is socially beneficial, then the case of the liberals is strong enough indeed. It is on the third of these conditions that I should like to focus attention.

Is the communication of the truth under all circumstances bound to be of benefit to society? This topic, much discussed in the eighteenth century, faded out of serious discussion in the wave of optimism of the Enlightenment. It came to be believed that superstition and ignorance, the causes of misery and injustice, could be eliminated by the discovery and spread of scientific knowledge to all mankind. The failure of this dream suggests that it is time that we revived the old question and faced it squarely.

Life is more complex than the solution of technological problems. Every nation or every group builds up a complex pattern of belief about itself and the world, and because of the finiteness of man and his inevitable ignorance this pattern of belief will contain much that is illusion. Human personality is a fragile thing in the presence of which the truth is often a corrosive agent. Too strong a dose of truth will destroy any personality except one which has a supreme and single dedication to the truth itself. Or to put this point in another way: For most people truth is one value among others, inferior in status probably to security or power or pleasure. Thus making truth absolute would involve an inversion of existing values if not of society itself.

But the true inquirer lives in another world. This is a world of insecurity of belief, because he is prone to question all beliefs. It is a world in which the pursuit of truth is the highest pleasure. In this world it *is* more important to be right than to be president. Yet that world is not self-sustaining. It is somehow a part of this world, and the inquirer must live in both worlds. If he does not find those who will support him even when they do not understand what he is doing (how could they—if they did, they would be doing it too) and though they do not know where he will come out (how could they—he does not know himself), either he secures a patron, that is, or he devotes part of his time to earning a living. Spinoza ground lenses and kept his ideas to himself and his friends. The modern inquirer tends for the most part to teach in a college or university. The tension that results from the pulls of his first love, inquiry, and the tugs of wage-earning activity, pedagogy, is an embodiment in the individual of the opposition between science and society.

If only he could inquire how, where and into whatever he wants, and teach in the same manner, he could have his cake and eat it. But this is a utopian dream, noble but difficult to bring to realization. In practice, every man, inquirer or not, has his duty to society and society formulates most of the terms in which that duty is to be fulfilled. The inquirer in a democratic society cannot claim special privilege. He too must be accountable to society for his actions, and his publishing and his teaching are his actions. He cannot avoid this by saying to society, "If you leave me alone I shall make discoveries that will benefit you," because he cannot know what these discoveries will be or whether they will be beneficial.

Does this mean that the claim to academic freedom has no adequate rationale? Not at all. It means that the liberal rationale of academic freedom is superficial and optimistic and needs to be replaced by one which does not fall into the delusion of automatic social progress through the increase of knowledge. It may even mean that Socratic withdrawal from social action and political life is the only way in the long run to achieve freedom of inquiry. The pressure of political party and social usefulness are detrimental to scholarly objectivity and philosophic calm. The paradoxical truth seems to be that the pursuit of the truth can be socially beneficial in the long run only if it is not oriented in terms of the changing problems and tastes of the times.

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TELEVISION

I DON'T KNOW if you've noticed, but the radio and television networks seem to be suffering from a compulsion to make themselves ridiculous or, at least, to stick out their chins and invite a solid wallop. Take, for example, NBC's *Monitor,* the incredible mishmash that squeaks, whistles, groans, and snortles through the loudspeaker all weekend long. I wouldn't dream of attempting to describe *Monitor*—you have to hear it to believe it—but I will say that it goes in heavily for on-the-spot newscasts and unusual interviews. It also makes endless use of the talents of the comedy team, Bob and Ray, and Bob and Ray go in heavily for on-the-spot newscasts and unusual interviews. The difficulty is that the listener has almost no way of distinguishing between the "straight" newscasts and interviews and the intentionally goofy ones. I remember one weekend when I heard spot reports on a checker championship and a race on water skis, and though I know that one of the two was a gag, I'm damned if I'm sure which one it was.

This brings me, the long way, to the recent *Ford Star Jubilee* on CBS television, presenting Mary Martin and Noel Coward. This show ran ninety minutes, and the two stars impressed this fact on the audience by singing, repeatedly, a song called "Ninety Minutes Is a Long, Long Time."

Actually, the ninety minutes of Martin and Coward wasn't so awfully long. Miss Martin looked a trifle gaunt, but she was thoroughly charming, and in addition to her traditional *South Pacific* medley, she sang some first-rate songs. Mr. Coward looked embalmed but proved that he wasn't by rolling his eyes, shaking his hips, and singing dozens of his own compositions. Since he has no voice, he was terrible on those songs with melody, but he was splendid on the patter numbers, including a dandy I hadn't heard before called "What's Going to Happen to the Tots?" The two stars—there wasn't another soul in the cast—took turns performing and then teamed up in a lengthy finale in which they cavorted all over a giant sofa, displayed great mutual affection, and sang snatches of more old songs than I could count. All in all, the show was good fun, but it *was* long. If about a third of it had been omitted, the remaining sixty minutes would have been, I think, a much more consistent delight.

There have been a number of other ninety-minute shows this fall, and most of them *have* been too long. The most painful was an earlier edition of *Ford Star Jubilee,* starring Judy Garland. I know nothing about Miss Garland's personal problems, but I do know that it was an uncomfortable experience to watch that very talented performer teeter for an hour and a half on the edge of what seemed to be nervous and physical collapse. The worst of the shows, in that there seemed to be no excuse for it at all, was an NBC lemon, in color, called *Show Biz.* Despite the presence in the cast of people like Groucho Marx and Bert Lahr, this one was totally lacking in all the qualities of good theatre. It did manage to look cheap, which is characteristic of much of show business but certainly not of big-budget TV.

The longest of the ninety-minute shows was a Sunday afternoon entertainment by NBC called *Wide, Wide World.* It was handled by Dave Garroway, who puts in countless hours on *Monitor* and, in general, suffers for the cause to a degree far beyond the call of duty. Mr. Garroway began by telling us that the whole show was *live* (NBC has the curious notion that a bad show "live" is better than a good show on film or on tape) and that seventy-one or seventy-three cameras (Dave gave both figures) and 1,800 (yes, 1,800) technicians were involved. The theme was "Autumn Harvest," and the seventy-one, or seventy-three, cameras picked up the following scenes: a rural setting in Mercer County, New Jersey; San Francisco (ride on cable car); the Mississippi River (ride on steamboat); the Princeton campus (singing by invisible glee club); a steel plant in Cleveland; a Nebraska cornfield; the Texas State Fair in Dallas (ride in ferris wheel); an underwater theater in Florida; Lake Mead, Nevada (to watch a record-breaking speedboat run which never materialized); the Grand Canyon; and Rockefeller Center (visits to the *Monitor* show and to the Radio City Music Hall). It was, as you can see, a very ambitious show, and it's a pity that it wasn't a good one. The main trouble, outside of the hopeless snafu at Lake Mead, was that most of the material, just didn't look like much on a 21-inch screen.

The other oversized shows I've watched have been plays, and I've decided that a good play can run for practically any length of time as long as the television people don't mess around with it. *Skin of Our Teeth* ran 120 minutes on NBC, and every minute of it was a pleasure. José Ferrer's *Cyrano* ran ninety minutes, and it was a fine *Cyrano. Our Town* ran ninety minutes, and because it was tricked up with musical comedy songs and with Frank Sinatra fantastically miscast, it wasn't nearly as good as it should have been.

There have been two other ninety-minute shows that I won't comment on. One of them was *Heidi,* and I didn't watch it. The other was *Alice in Wonderland.* I watched it, but since I have never appreciated nor enjoyed nor understood *Alice* in any form, I have declared myself incompetent to pass judgment. I shall content myself with humming, quietly "Ninety Minutes Is a Long, Long Time."

DAVID R. EBBITT

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THEATRE

FOREIGN ACTORS are not necessarily better than native ones, but by their proficiency in another style they make us acutely aware of our limitations, such an awareness being the beginning of all improvement. To see the actors of the *Comédie Française,* now playing at the Broadway Theatre, is to become aware

Le bourgeois gentilhomme, by Molière (Broadway).

of limitation in that tradition of acting which we may call naturalistic. Our actors chiefly sit, and when they sit, they lounge. These actors chiefly stand, though, when they sit, they sit well. When our actors do stand, they look for a raised surface to place one foot on; then they lean sagely forward and place one elbow on the raised knee. The French actors stand erect. About arms there is a similar story to tell. To our actors, an arm is an instrument to lean on things with, and the things are not always inanimate: our actors find it hard to keep their hands off their colleagues or even off themselves, for one arm can keep the other busy; and of course our modern costume is provided with an escape from the whole problem —the trouser pocket, the naturalistic actor's first and last refuge. The French actors never seem to lean on anything, and as for clinging to each other's bodies, they hardly ever even touch hands. They have taught their arms to cope with the circumambient air. One of our leading actors, faced with a classic script, once asked me: "But what is there for an actor to do?" He had noted the absence of cigarettes, drinks, food, spittoons . . . for of such is the kingdom of naturalism. The implicit answer in the work of the *Comédie Française* is: when there is nothing to do, do nothing. For example, there is a "meal" in which the actors neither eat nor pretend to. They just sit. For the focus of the action is elsewhere. Again, the American actor will say: "I can't stand there propping up the wall, give me something to do," while these fine French actors, when the focus is not on them, contentedly stand to one side doing nothing, and their doing so would never raise a question in any spectator's mind.

When an actor exercises a much higher degree of selectivity, he inevitably throws a heavier stress on the things he does do. To justify its omission of certain kinds of detail, the *Comédie Française* exhibits proficiency in certain forms of action as far removed from common behavior as playing the piano is from ringing a doorbell. Reading the first scene of *Le bourgeois gentilhomme* we think we exhaust in a moment the content of the stage direction: "takes his hand and makes him dance." Actually, the phrase is only related to performance as a signpost is to landscape. What we get is Lulli's music, and two carefully related dances: the dancing master's correct and attractive one, and M. Jourdain's bad, but carefully bad, imitation of it. In passages like this—and the play is made up of them—the French actors do things which our actors could not even learn during a long rehearsal period. For they attain a style which is the product of a whole career in this sort of work; and behind the individual career is the career of the institution. It is the story of the Oxford lawns—mow them for 200 years, sir—all over again.

Among the many performances of the *Comédie Française* that I have seen, this one is among the best-looking and (thanks to Lulli) among the best-sounding. There is a gasp from the audience when the curtain rises on Suzanne Lalique's dazzling white salon with its gilded balcony and spiral stairway, and further murmurs of delight greet all the dances of the show, which have their climax in the lurid comic nightmare of the Turkish episode. I would judge the director of this and many other *Comédie* productions, Jean Meyer, to be one of the supreme directors of our time. His work does not call attention to direction itself, but each part of the show is perfectly molded, and the parts are united in a subtly expressive whole. No director has a lighter touch. Meyer makes Molière move with the delicate, darting rhythm of Mozart.

The acting affords an example of French ensemble work at its best but not quite of great individual performance where it would be most welcome—namely, in the role of M. Jourdain. Whatever theorists say in favor of en-

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sembles, the old playwrights wrote for stars. Molière went even further: he wrote for himself. And I think that particularly Molière's own roles require an actor with two qualities which even the perfected ensemble actor need not have: the authority or magnetism of a great star and the human substance of a representative man. These qualities are hard to define, but when the *Comédie* invited the late Raimu to play M. Jourdain, one feels that they understood. In addition to the theatrical glamour of a star, Raimu carried with him so much of the very pith and substance of non-aristocratic French life. The play is not ruined for lack of a Raimu, but its possibilities can only be fully realized, I suspect, through such a man. Louis Seigner who plays the part at the Broadway is an actor of great ability and charm, yet he is either too delicate or too much a formalist to give us the ugly and shocking thrust of Jourdain's mania. In the English sense, at least, he is too much of a gentleman.

Aside from this single reservation, my response to the show was wholly jubilant. This is superb performing, and it is Molière. This author, it is true, is ignored by our theatre, and even some French critics have levelled criticisms at him which, if taken seriously, would wipe him off the map. It has been said, for example, that his style is bad. I have also read that *Le bourgeois gentilhomme* is carelessly constructed. This last opinion is a careless construction if ever there was one. I defy anyone to attend the current performance and not notice that the form is as elegant and firm as that of a Bach suite. And, as to action, the play simmers, rises to a boil, and then positively boils over: if that is not organic form, what is? The fact is that here is a genius too huge, irregular, and, as it were, Gothic to be contained in those schoolmaster's categories of which so much French commentary consists. It may be that, as to method, he improvised some of his forms, but, once finished, they were no more improvisations than is the last movement of Beethoven's Ninth or any other masterpiece which may have begun in caprice. The comic sense of life was more highly developed in him, it would seem, than in any other human being that ever existed, and he gave this sense the purest expression one can ever imagine its having. When we recall that he is fully accessible only in performance, and only in excellent performance at that, we realize how much we owe to our French visitors.

ERIC BENTLEY

Notes on Contributors

WILLIAM S. WHITE is a Washington correspondent for the *New York Times*. LEON EDEL, who teaches at New York University, is completing the second volume of his biography of Henry James. HENRY M. MAGID is a professor at the College of the City of New York. DAVID R. EBBITT is on the staff of a text-book publishing house.

A COMMUNICATION

The Future of Germany

In his article in *The New Republic* of April 10, 1954, J. F. Golay, former head of the US Secretariat of the Allied High Commission in Germany, predicted that "the rearmament of Western Germany will almost certainly mean the end of any chance of reunifying Germany by four-power agreement." For the past two years, Mr. Golay has been working on a study of the German Republic.

SIRS:

Seventeen months ago, I maintained in this journal that we could not do better than stand still in our relations with Western Germany. By doing so, I argued, we and our other Western partners would retain freedom of action for the future. Should conditions develop favorable to the negotiations of a four-power agreement to reunite Germany, we would be able to take advantage of them. If they did not, equally we would be in a position to prevent any move in Germany to our detriment.

Since then, we have begun to rearm the Western Germans and, disregarding the safeguards which we ourselves put into the Bonn and Paris agreements, have allowed the way to be opened to direct negotiations between the Bonn and Soviet governments on the future of Germany.

We are, as a consequence, losing our freedom of action in Germany. We cannot come to an agreement with the Soviets, even if they were disposed to withdraw from Eastern Germany, because, by rearming Western Germany, we shall already have prejudged the question whether all of Germany is to be rearmed and we dare not risk reuniting a rearmed Germany which is to remain outside our own security system. Neither dare the Soviets risk a rearmed Germany outside their security system. Hence, the way to four-power agreement is closed.

At the same time, we are rapidly losing—if we have not already lost—all power to prevent the Germans coming to an understanding with the Soviets at our expense. The process will be complete when substantial German forces are in being. The least we have to fear is that these forces may be withdrawn from their NATO commitments. Of the strong position in which we once stood to control developments in Germany, all that remains to us now is such security as is afforded by the good faith of an estimable but aged politician.

The majority of Western Germans have hitherto supported Adenauer's exclusively Western-oriented policy because the economic recovery and the security of Western Germany depended on it. The first has been accomplished. As for the second, whatever value the Western Germans now set upon the ability of NATO forces to defend them (the valuation varies considerably), it is doubtful in the extreme whether the majority will be prepared to pay for it the price of a permanent division of Germany. From the start, Adenauer himself felt obliged to present rearmament and the NATO tie to the German public as the course most likely to lead to reunification. But the prospects for reunification are now poorer than ever. It looks to the Germans as though the major powers were preparing to found such arrangements as they can make to get along together on a tacit acceptance of the *status quo* in Germany. Hence the strain in Adenauer's coalition. Herr Dehler, the parliamentary leader of the Free Democrats, the

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second party in the coalition, on September 25 described the Paris treaties as "aggravating German partition." He said that his party would be "loyal" to the treaties, but that they must not stand in the way of Germany's right to negotiate on reunification. Direct talks between the German and Soviet governments, he said, would be more important than the coming meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Geneva. Like views have been expressed by other Free Democrats and even by some Christian Democrats.

Adenauer and the conservative and pro-government press have of course taken Herr Dehler sharply to task for thus undermining Western confidence in the federal government's loyalty to its commitments. Other conservative and independent newspapers have not been so censorious:

> The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (September 25) thought that Germany could give up the Atlantic pact if it would lead to a reunited Germany in a really peaceful world, but added that, of course, the initiative should not come from the Germans themselves. The *Westdeutsche Allgemeine* (September 29) agreed that, if the Paris agreement blocked reunification, the demand of the Free Democrats and Social Democrats for discussion of revision of the agreement would be consistent with Article 10. The *Mainz Allgemeine Zeitung* (September 30) said that if the Federal Republic took the initiative on reunification, it would be doing no more than exercising its rights under its newly recovered sovereignty. If revision of the Paris agreement should be required, the editor held, one should not hesitate to call for it. No breach of the Federal Republic's obligations would be involved, in view of Article 10.

The Social Democrats and the neutralists hold these views to a man.

The Western Ministers have done their best to make the Soviets look bad at Geneva. But this will not divert German attention from the hard fact that we are able to do nothing to promote reunification, whereas the Russians are able to do everything and much else, too, that the Germans desire.

The Western Foreign Ministers are apparently prepared to trust the present Western German government to negotiate with the Russians. For that matter, there are political leaders in Germany in whom I too would have confidence in such dealings. But that is beside the point. No one can be sure that these leaders will have the control of affairs in Germany in the coming years.

The plain fact is that—with Western Germany rearmed—it is we, not the Russians, who will have the most pressing need to come to an understanding on the status of Germany and a European security system. Our leaders apparently do not grasp this point. Their bumbling complacency is reminiscent of Baldwinism in the thirties. They do not even trouble to make out a decent case for themselves. Mr. Dulles and Mr. Macmillan, as with one voice, assure the Western Germans that anyway world opinion will one day compel the Soviets to hand over the Eastern zone. When, the Germans ask, has world opinion ever compelled the Soviet government to do anything? The gentlemen answer, "Well, take Austria." What on earth can they be thinking of? Austria cannot be and does not want to be a member of NATO. The final terms for the ending of the occupation in Austria were negotiated between the Austrian and Soviet governments. Is this what Mr. Dulles and Mr. Macmillan want for Germany?

The only solution for Germany which has the slightest chance of being accepted by all concerned today is one which leaves none of the parties in a worse position than they are now. This means that neither NATO nor the Eastern system can be weakened or strengthened at the expense of the other, that Germany must be reunited in conditions of political freedom, and that all concerned must feel assured that Germany's position and power will not be exploited in the future to their detriment. The only way to achieve the latter is by making Germany's security the concern of all, that is to say, by creating a United Nations defense force for Germany in which all the interested parties, including a reunited Germany, participate. Such an arrangement would not entail "recognizing" or "guaranteeing" Eastern Communist regimes. It need not even entail a final settlement of Germany's eastern frontier. But by removing the principal source of political trouble: the partition of Germany, such a solution would go a long way to create a favorable environment for the settlement of other vexatious issues.

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
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